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I. INTRODUCTION 
Television network Lifetime recently aired a documentary titled 
“Surviving R. Kelly.” This six-part documentary featured woman after 
woman discussing their experiences of sexual abuse by one of the 
entertainment industry’s biggest stars. Not only were most of these victims 
underage at the time of the abuse, many waited to speak out because they 
were bound by confidentiality agreements with R. Kelly’s management 
company. The series was received with mixed opinions, but many stood 
in solidarity with the women due to the open forum started by the 
#MeToo1 movement. 
Prior to the R. Kelly story, Hollywood was under scrutiny for a 
very similar story about Harvey Weinstein. “On October 5, 2017, the New 
York Times revealed that Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein had 
reached at least eight settlements with women in response to allegations 
of sexual harassment, some dating back to 1990.”2 Like R. Kelly, Harvey 
Weinstein used confidentiality agreements to keep his transgressions 
secret.3 Specifically, Weinstein used confidentiality agreements in 
settlements with the victims, where the victims accepting payouts agreed 
to strict confidentiality clauses prohibiting them from discussing the deal 
and the events leading to it. 4 The Harvey Weinstein story also received 
heightened scrutiny due to social media and the #MeToo movement. 
Even before social media and the #MeToo movement, one famous 
example that demonstrates the consequence of using confidentiality 
agreements in sexual abuse cases “came to light” 5 about fifteen years ago 
from the Catholic Church.6 “For years, the Church used confidential 
settlements to silence victims who had been abused by priests.” 7 These 
confidentiality agreements hid the identities of the priests, and thus 
allowed the priests to continue to serve at their parishes or other ministries 
 
1  The #MeToo movement is a movement against sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
This movement has shed light on the prevalence of sexual abuse, especially in the 
workplace. See also ME TOO, www.metoomvmt.org. 
2  Vasundhara Prasad, Note: If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of 
Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret 
Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2507-2508 (2018); Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, 
Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations 
.html. 
3  Kantor & Twohey, supra note 2. 
4  Id. 
5  “For there is nothing hidden that will not be disclosed, and nothing concealed that will 
not be known or brought out into the open.” Luke 8:17 (NIV). 
6  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2516-17. 
7  Id. 
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despite allegations of sexual assault.8 In one specific case from 1997, the 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany settled with a young man who had 
been regularly abused by a priest since the age of twelve, for almost $1 
million, using a confidentiality agreement.9  The $1 million was just under 
the amount required to trigger the Church from having to request approval 
from its oversight board.10 Therefore, the strategic settlement protected the 
priest and the church from any public inquiry.11 The confidential 
settlement “allowed the abusive priest to keep his identity private, continue 
working with the Church, and presumably, even repeat his abuse with 
impunity,” in exchange for the victim’s silence.12 
With the current social climate, the right to speak is more 
important than ever. Even in the employment sector, where confidentiality 
agreements are frequently used, these agreements can be detrimental to 
society. The public has a right to know when private parties are contracting 
about matters of public interest and sexual abuse is a major area of public 
interest as evidenced by the #MeToo movement. However, the public is 
currently limited in its knowledge due to confidentiality agreements in this 
realm. 
This comment will discuss why Florida courts should not enforce 
confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements, especially in light 
of the #MeToo movement, and how Florida courts should interpret the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act in sexual abuse settlements. Confidentiality 
agreements in sexual abuse settlements make it possible for the abuser to 
continue to victimize others. Therefore, confidentiality agreements in 
sexual abuse settlements should be deemed void under the Florida 
Sunshine in Litigation Act (“Act”), which voids any court order or private 
agreement that conceals a “public hazard.”13 
The Florida legislature enacted the Sunshine in Litigation Act in 
1990.14 This Act provides that “a court may not enter a judgment that 
conceals a public hazard.”15 The Act has only been brought up in disputes 
a few times before the Florida courts. However, no actions disputing the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act has been brought in the sexual abuse context.16 
 
8  Id. 
9  Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6, 
2002), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-
abuse-priest-foryears/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2516-17. 
13  FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018). 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  The third district referred to the Act in Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 
896 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), but denied construing the Act in any way. 
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And, to date, there has been no published court decision on whether a 
person against whom a sexual abuse claim has been made can be 
considered a “public hazard.” This note argues, however, that alleged 
sexual abusers do fit the Act’s definition of a “public hazard,” and that, as 
such, Florida courts should interpret the Act to prohibit concealing 
information via confidentiality agreements.17 As a result, confidentiality 
agreements in sexual abuse settlements would be void under Florida law. 
Currently, courts perform a balancing test when presented with contracts 
that may violate public policy. However, this remedy is not adequate to 
protect the public’s interest in knowing about the settlement of such claims 
because it includes a fact-intensive inquiry that applies on a case by case 
basis only, rather than being applied as a bright-line rule, as this note 
suggests. This comment also argues that, if it were construed that the 
concealment of sexual abuse settlements and related confidentiality 
agreements are not prohibited by the Sunshine in Litigation Act, the 
Florida legislature should enact a statute prohibiting the concealment of 
such settlements. 
While Part I of this paper has provided an introduction to some of 
the most salient issues affecting this topic, Part II of this comment will 
discuss the clash of two freedoms – the freedom of speech and the freedom 
of contract – as it relates to confidentiality agreements in cases of alleged 
sexual abuse. Part III will discuss the remedy for sexual abuse victims 
under current contract principles. Part IV will discuss the Florida Sunshine 
in Litigation Act and how Florida courts should interpret confidentiality 
in sexual abuse settlements. Part V will discuss a possible resolution while 
considering a victim’s privacy concerns and Part VI will provide a 
conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE CLASH BETWEEN TWO FREEDOMS 
Before analyzing confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse 
settlements and the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act, it is important to 
discuss the important beliefs which may be implicated by this issue. 
Confidentiality agreements create a tension between two longstanding 
American ideals: the freedom of speech and the freedom of contract. Both 
of these freedoms derive from the Constitution of the United States. This 
section of the comment will discuss the freedom of speech, the freedom of 
contract and the tension between both freedoms that is evident in when 
discussing the current presence – and perhaps, future prohibition – of 
confidentiality agreements. 
 
17  Fla. Stat. § 69.081. 
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Freedom of Speech 
The freedom of speech is a fundamental right and specifically 
provided for in the language of the First Amendment. The First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution prescribes, in pertinent part, 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”18 
The rights described within the First Amendment are considered 
fundamental rights – ones that are “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,”19 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”20 
Indeed, the freedom of speech has historically been considered so valuable 
that it has been deemed as a preferred right over other rights, to be 
protected at all costs. And, although the First Amendment was originally 
written to protect “the people”21 from the government’s infringement on 
their right to speak, the protection of the freedom of speech has now 
become a matter not only of constitutional law and construction, but of 
public policy as well.22 The First Amendment right to free speech is 
essential to keep the public informed of matters of public interest, because 
an individual’s right and ability to speak affects the public’s knowledge.  
Indeed, the right to speak is essential to democracy and liberty. As Harvard 
professor Steven Pinker wrote: 
There’s a systematic reason why dictators brook no 
dissent. The immiserated subjects of a tyrannical regime 
are not deluded that they are happy. And if tens of 
millions of disaffected citizens act together, no regime has 
the brute force to resist them. The reason that citizens 
don’t resist their overlords en masse is that they lack what 
logicians call common knowledge — the knowledge that 
everyone else shares their knowledge. Common 
knowledge is a prerequisite to coordinating behavior for 
mutual benefit: two friends will show up at the same café 
at a given time only if each knows that the other knows 
that both know about the appointment. In the case of civil 
resistance, people will expose themselves to the risk of 
 
18  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
19  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
20  Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986). 
21  “We the people . . . “ See U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
22  Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 320-21 (1998). 
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reprisal by a despotic regime only if they know that others 
are exposing themselves to that risk at the same time.23 
It is clear that confidentiality clauses limit one’s ability to speak freely, 
thus also impacting the ability of the public to know certain details about 
particular allegations, or even to know that the allegations exist at all. And, 
while contracting away one’s right to speak in this limited way may not 
necessarily lead to tyranny, it nonetheless places a chokehold on 
democracy by limiting a fundamental right to free speech, thus limiting 
common knowledge as well. 
Freedom of Contract 
However, the freedom of speech is not the only constitutional right 
that matters in this scenario. Indeed, limiting one’s ability to contract away 
their right to speech implicates one’s freedom of contract, which is found 
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  While a contract 
is a generally enforceable agreement,24 it is often deemed void when “it 
produces no legal obligation.”25 Contracts may also be struck down on 
grounds of public policy.26 Part III of this comment will discuss the 
balancing test under Restatement (second) of Contracts §section 178 that 
strikes down contracts on grounds of public policy. However, the section 
178 balancing test favors the enforcement of contracts. The general 
purpose of contract law is to “recognize [] the power of parties to order 
their own affairs without the intrusion of the government” – and, contract 
law accomplishes this by providing a method of legal enforcement for 
people’s private promises to each other. 27 Contract law allows people to 
make their own private law as legally enforceable as the laws made by 
legislatures.28 
The freedom of contract essentially provides that individuals have 
the right to sign contracts including whatever terms to which they choose 
to agree. This is beneficial because it promotes a free market and a laissez-
faire economy, which is why public policy usually favors the enforcement 
of contracts. Nevertheless, the “government can generate rules prohibiting 
 
23  Steven Pinker, Three Reasons Free Speech Matters, FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC 
EDUCATION (Nov. 7, 2014), https://fee.org/articles/three-reasons-free-speech-matters/. 
24  A contract is an enforceable agreement. CONTRACT, The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier 
Law Dictionary Desk Edition. 
25  PERILLO, JOSEPH M., CONTRACTS 19 (7th ed. 2014). Under the Sunshine in Litigation 
Act, discussed in Part IV of this comment, a confidentiality agreement would produce “no 
legal obligation” in sexual abuse settlements. 
26  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15. 
27  HILLMAN, ROBERT A., PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (4th ed. 2019). 
28  Id. 
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certain types of private agreements . . . “ and “can refuse to enforce certain 
private contracts,” usually on the grounds that these types of agreements 
run contrary to public policy.29 Part IV of this comment will discuss how 
the Sunshine in Litigation Act can serve to deem a contract void even if it 
is not considered contrary to public policy under a section 178 balancing 
test.30 Indeed, unlike, the section 178 balancing test, the Act provides a 
clear rule that favors not enforcing contracts that conceal a public hazard.31 
Once the “public hazard” language has been applied to confidentiality 
agreements in the context of sexual assault and abuse, it will be clear that 
these agreements cannot stand under the Sunshine in Litigation Act, 
regardless of whether they can or cannot be construed as running contrary 
to public policy. 
Confidentiality Agreements: Promises of Silence and Signing Away 
the Right to Speak 
As previously discussed, confidentiality agreements within 
settlement contracts for alleged sexual abuse can create a direct tension 
between the freedom of speech and the freedom of contract. “If a contract 
is a legally enforceable promise, a contract of silence is an enforceable 
promise to keep quiet about something.”32 A confidentiality agreement—
also termed nondisclosure agreement— is “often required as a condition 
of employment.”33 However, there are other purposes besides employment 
that require signing a confidentiality agreement. These agreements are 
especially utilized in settlements.34 
During litigation, the parties may reach an agreement and seek “a 
court order of secrecy.”35 In essence, the parties will ask the judge to 
approve the settlement with a confidentiality order.36 “Alternatively, the 
parties may make the settlement contingent on the claimant dropping the 
case against the defendant and further promising to never speak about 
 
29  Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U.L. 
REV. 263, 280. 
30  The Sunshine in Litigation Act will deem a contract void even if it is contrary to public 
policy favoring the enforcement of contracts. 
31  “(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of 
concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information 
which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which 
may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy and may not be 
enforced.” FLA. STAT. § 69.081(4) (2018). 
32  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15. 
33  Supra, note 1. 
34  An agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit. SETTLEMENT, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). 
35  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15. 
36  Id. 
2019] CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS 69 
 
either the settlement or the events leading to the settlement.”37 The 
consequences of breaking “contracted silence,” once a confidentiality 
agreement is signed by the parties may include a financial penalty, in 
addition to full repayment of the settlement amount and the payment of 
the opposing party’s legal fees.38 The possibility of financial liability 
severely impacts the freedom of victims to “speak publicly about [their 
abuse, or] the events that led to the signing of these agreements.”39 
Several advocates active in the #MeToo movement have criticized 
confidentiality agreements, specifically in connection with allegations of 
sexual abuse, arguing that they have “the detrimental negative effects” of 
“silencing victims” and enabling “repeat offenders.”40 R. Kelly and 
Harvey Weinstein are clear examples of how confidentiality agreements 
can contribute to a legal and social culture that protects sexual abusers and 
enables them to become repeat offenders, as critics have recently 
discussed. In 2003, the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
announced that “5.3 percent of sex offenders (men who had committed 
rape or sexual assault) were rearrested for another sex crime.”41 The 
announcement also stated that “ . . . sex offenders were about four times 
more likely than non-sex offenders to be arrested for another sex crime 
after their discharge from prison – clearly outlining that repeat offenders 
in the sexual abuse context are a valid and pressing concern.42 
Confidentiality agreements are usually considered to be 
enforceable, largely because courts rarely interfere with the freedom of 
contract.43 However, in limited circumstances, the courts have declined to 
enforce a contract in the name of public policy and in the interest of 
disclosure to the public.44 In civil cases, courts also have the authority to 
nullify confidentiality agreements “where disclosure is in the public 
interest.”45  However, when there is a lack of a clear, legislative 
expression, courts are more and more hesitant to tamper with contracts or 
 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Hogan Lovells, #MeToo Movement’s Impact on Nondisclosure Agreements or 
Clauses Covering Sexual Harassment, HOGAN LOVELLS ALL IN A DAY’S WORK: THE 
EMPLOYER’S LEGAL GUIDE (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.hlemploymentblog.com/2018/04/metoo-movements-impact-nondisclosure-
agreements-clauses-covering-sexual-harassment/ [hereinafter, Hogan Lovells]. 
41  Bureau of Justice Statistics, 5 Percent of Sex Offenders Rearrested for Another Sex 
Crime Within 3 Years of Prison Release, BJS (Nov. 16, 2003, 4:30PM), 
https://www.bjs.gov/ content/pub/press/rsorp94pr.cfm. 
42  Id. 
43  See Prasad, supra note 2, at 2513-15. 
44  Id. at 2513. 
45  Id. at 2513-14. 
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to develop “broad social policy.”46 Due to the courts’ hesitation to develop 
policy of this kind, it is important for legislatures to step in and create laws 
that prevent confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements.47 
III. CURRENT REMEDY FOR VICTIMS UNDER CONTRACT 
PRINCIPLES: WHEN CONTRACTING AWAY YOUR RIGHT TO SPEAK 
DOES NOT ALIGN WITH PUBLIC POLICY 
Balancing 
Due to the lack of legislation on  this matter currently, the remedy 
for victims of sexual abuse seeking to invalidate a confidentiality 
agreement at this point would be found via the principles laid out in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 178.48 Under section 178, 
courts perform a balancing test when presented with any contract, or any 
piece of a contract, that might violate public policy. 49 For example, courts 
could theoretically find confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse 
settlements void as a matter of public policy if “the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.”50 Though confidentiality 
agreements are contracts between private parties, they present a conflict 
between the public policy favoring the freedom of contract and the public 
policy favoring the freedom of speech. 
Unenforceability on Grounds of Public Policy: Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 178 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 178 
states: 
When a Term Is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public 
Policy: 
 
46  Id. at 2514; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. b (1981) 
(discussing how, in reaching the conclusion “that a term is unenforceable[,]” the court 
relies on both “its own perception of the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare 
or from legislation that is relevant to that policy although it says nothing explicitly about 
unenforceability). 
47  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. a (1981) (“Occasionally, on 
grounds of public policy, legislation provides that specified kinds of promises or other 
terms are unenforceable”). 
48  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
49  Id. 
50  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981). 
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(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation 
provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances 
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms. 
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, 
account is taken of 
(a) the parties’ justified expectations, 
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement 
were denied, and 
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement 
of the particular term. 
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a 
term, account is taken of 
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by 
legislation or judicial decisions, 
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term 
will further that policy, 
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved 
and the extent to which it was deliberate, and 
(d) the directness of the connection between that 
misconduct and the term.51 
 
The power of courts to deny enforcement to a contract on public 
policy grounds is not only indisputable, but also open-ended.52 Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 178, “a contract or term will be 
unenforceable when public policy considerations against enforcement 
clearly outweigh the interests in favor of enforcement.”53 The balancing 
test “allows courts to derive public policy by considering other laws as 
well as their own sense of what restrictions are needed to protect the public 
welfare.”54 When applying the balancing test, the decision of whether or 
 
51  Id. 
52  Garfield, supra note 22, at 294-95. 
53  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
54  Garfield, supra note 22, at 295. 
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not to enforce a confidentiality agreement is based on a “fact-intensive 
inquiry.”55 “Such fact-intensive inquiries are common when courts police 
contracts for public policy violations.”56 In conducting balancing tests for 
contracts of silence, the court would weigh the fundamental right to speak 
and the value of the information being protected, versus the importance of 
upholding the contract and affirming an individual’s right to freedom of 
contract. 
This balancing test has been used in the past to invalidate 
confidentiality agreements as a matter of public policy. For example, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has decided that a 
settlement agreement, even in sexual abuse circumstances, can prevent an 
employee “from seeking monetary or other individual relief at the 
agency.57  However, “courts and the EEOC have invalidated agreement 
terms that interfere with an individual’s non-waivable right as a matter of 
public policy to file a charge or otherwise communicate with the EEOC.”58 
Despite this limited success in application, utilizing a fact-intensive 
balancing test (as required under section 178 of the Restatement 
((Second)) of Contracts) as a method of invalidating confidentiality 
clauses as a remedy is not sufficient to protect victims of sexual abuse and 
their right to speak, as well as the public’s right to know. This is because 
using a fact-intensive balancing test produces different results on a case 
by case basis.59   As such, a more desirable method of attacking these 
problematic confidentiality agreements would be via the adoption of a 
clear rule that can be applied with confidence, whenever a court is 
presented with confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements.. 
Legislatures can help the courts by providing a clear, administrable rule to 
help solve this issue; or, courts can choose to interpret laws that are already 
on the books – namely, the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act – as clearly 
prohibiting these confidentiality agreements in this context. Parts IV and 
V of this comment will analyze the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act as 
a possible avenue to providing Florida courts with a clear rule for the 
invalidation of these worrisome agreements. 
 
55  Id. at 318. 
56  Id. 
57  Hogan Lovells, supra note 40. 
58  Id. 
59  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2541-42. 
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IV. THE FLORIDA SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT 
Confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements should be 
deemed void60 under the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act (“Act”), which 
voids any court order or private agreement that conceals a “public 
hazard.”61 The Act, in part, states: 
69.081 Sunshine in Litigation; Concealment of Public 
Hazards Prohibited. 
(1) This section may be cited as the “Sunshine in 
Litigation Act.” 
(2) As used in this section, “public hazard” means an 
instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, 
instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of 
a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that 
has caused and is likely to cause injury. 
(3) Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an 
order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of 
concealing a public hazard or any information concerning 
a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or 
judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing 
any information which may be useful to members of the 
public in protecting themselves from injury which may 
result from the public hazard. 
(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the 
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any 
information concerning a public hazard, or any 
information which may be useful to members of the 
public in protecting themselves from injury which may 
result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public 
policy62 and may not be enforced . . . 
 
60  This could serve a similar purpose as the first Restatement of Contracts definition of 
“illegal bargain.” A bargain is “illegal . . . if either its formation or its performance is 
criminal, tortious or otherwise opposed to public policy. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 512 (1932). Here, the formation of a bargain under confidentiality 
agreements in sexual abuse settlements, in Florida, would be criminal in a sense because it 
would violate Florida law. 
61  FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018). 
62  Although public policy favors the enforcement of contracts, the Act favors public 
disclosure. 
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(6) Any substantially affected person, including but not 
limited to representatives of news media, has standing to 
contest an order, judgment, agreement or contract that 
violates this section. A person may contest an order, 
judgment, agreement or contract that violates this section 
by motion in the court that entered the order or judgment, 
or by bringing a declaratory judgment action pursuant to 
chapter 86 . . . 63 
The Florida Supreme Court has not yet reviewed any case 
concerning the Sunshine in Litigation Act. But there have been about 
twenty-four cases heard in other Florida courts regarding the Act, with the 
most recent case being from 2017 and with three opinions being 
withdrawn altogether. Furthermore, Florida courts have not yet gotten the 
chance to review a sexual abuse settlement case under the Sunshine in 
Litigation Act. The Third District Court of Appeal referred to the Act in 
Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 896 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1997), but only “to observe that it was not called upon to decide whether 
the statute prohibited enforcement of the confidentiality provisions of a 
settlement agreement in a sexual harassment case.”64 Regardless of there 
being no case law in this particular, niche issue, this section will discuss 
certain relevant cases to provide background as to the courts’ 
interpretation of the Act in the context of sexual abuse settlements. 
Most sexual abuse settlements settle out of court, but Florida 
courts can still provide a safeguard to prevent confidentiality in these 
circumstances. If a case did go to the Florida Supreme Court, the Court 
should rule that alleged sexual abusers65 are a “public hazard” because 
they are “person[s] . . . that ha[ve] caused and [are] likely to cause 
injury.”66 Withholding valuable information of public interest, such as the 
identity of a sexual abuser due to a confidentiality agreement in a sexual 
abuse settlement, should qualify as a “condition of a person . . .  that has 
caused and is likely to cause injury.”67 Therefore, the Act would prevent 
concealing a sexual abuser’s identity because the Act favors public 
disclosure of a public hazard.68 And, as a result of this construction, sexual 
abuse settlements in Florida should be prohibited from concealment under 
the Act, and confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements would 
 
63  FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018). 
64  Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 896 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 
65  A sexual abuser could also be defined as “a person who could be charged with a felony 
sex offense.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (2019). 
66  FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018). 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
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be considered void under Florida law. Particularly in the context of the 
#MeToo movement, it is clear that many victims would have been 
protected if the public knew of the abuse of previous victims. Especially 
in egregious cases such as the sexual abuse running rampant in Catholic 
church, as well as the repeated abuses of Harvey Weinstein and R. Kelly, 
it is obvious that some of this abuse could’ve been curtailed had the public 
been properly informed. Indeed, it is even possible that some of these 
perpetrators (including Harvey Weinstein and R. Kelly) would have been 
jailed years ago, thus thereby reducing the number of victims he was able 
to access and reducing overall the amount of harm that inflicted upon 
society as a whole. Keeping this in mind, it is all the more vital that Florida 
courts uphold a bright-line rule invalidating confidentiality agreements in 
sexual abuse contexts, at this particular point in history; and, there is some 
common law basis for the promulgation of this rule, as well. 
Case Law in Favor of the “Public Hazard” Standard 
In 1992, the First District Court of Appeal in Florida applied the 
Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act and invalidated a court order for 
protection.69 In AcandS, Inc. v. Askew, an asbestos action, the trial court 
granted a protective order covering documents and depositions .70 
However, the Act, as applied by the appellate court, invalidated the court 
order because it concealed information concerning asbestos, which is 
considered a “public hazard” under the language of the Act.71 Just as a 
court order obfuscating from public view information related to an 
asbestos action is invalid, 72 similarly, a court order covering up an 
offender’s sexual misconduct should be invalid – because, just as asbestos 
has been viewed by courts as a public hazard, alleged sexual abusers 
should be viewed as the same.73 
Further support for this argument is found in Jones v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., wherein the Third District Court of Appeal found a 
public hazard in a personal injury action against a tire manufacturer.74 
Specifically, there the jury found that the plaintiff had been injured from 
an explosion of the manufacturer’s tire, and the court then deemed the tire 
to be a “public hazard” – as such, the court then chose to overturn a motion 
for a confidentiality order (which had prohibited the parties and their 
 
69  ACandS, Inc. v. Askew, 597 So. 2d 895, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 
70  Id. at 896. 
71  Id. 
72  ACandS, 597 So. 2d at 895. 
73  Florida courts could also interpret the Sunshine in Litigation Act considering the 
“California Felony Sex Law” that will be discussed further under section V of this 
comment. 
74  Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 899 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003). 
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counsel from disclosing the manufacturer’s documents obtained during the 
discovery).75 Following this ruling,  no order could be entered which 
would conceal information regarding the tire, because it had been 
determined by a jury – by a preponderance of the evidence, presumably – 
that that tire had injured a member of the public (namely, plaintiff Jones).76 
And, in a similar case – Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Schalmo – the 
Second District Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in entering 
a blanket confidentiality order without conducting an in-camera review to 
ensure that no information being concealed contained data on any public 
hazard, particularly regarding the treads (or lack thereof) of Goodyear’s 
tires.77 Following the holdings in Jones and Schalmo, it is only natural to 
argue that sexual abusers can be considered a public hazard because they 
cause personal injury to their victims, and have the potential to cause even 
further injury to future victims. Particularly when one considers that, 
within the context of Sunshine in Litigation Act jurisprudence, the burden 
to conceal is on the offender and the Act favors disclosure,78 it is clear that 
Florida courts should not be allowed to enter confidentiality orders in 
sexual abuse settlements as a matter of law. 
Case Law Against the “Public Hazard” Standard 
While the previous cases illustrate the attempts of Florida courts 
to determine what does qualify as a public hazard, courts in Florida have 
also worked to interpret what does not qualify as a public hazard. 
However, these cases are easily distinguishable from cases involving 
alleged sexual assault and abuse. For example, in State Farm Fire & 
Casualty, Co. v. Sosnowski, a Florida court held that economic fraud 
causing financial loss was not a public hazard within the meaning of the 
Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act.79 Clearly, cases involving sexual abuse 
concern more than mere financial injury and, as such, would not be 
constrained by this decision. Indeed, the main barrier that could prevent 
courts from declaring confidentiality clauses in the sexual abuse context 
to be void comes not in the form of conflicting case law, but in an analysis 
of legislative intent. 
Unfortunately, the Sunshine in Litigation Act is not written 
specifically for sexual abuse settlements and, as such, its language may 
provide “wiggle-room” for offenders. Indeed, since the Act was not 
 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 905-06. 
77  See generally, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Schalmo, 987 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 
2nd DCA 2008). 
78  FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018). 
79  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski, 830 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). 
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enacted specifically to apply in the context of sexual abuse claims, Florida 
courts are not obligated to the interpret the Act to apply in these kinds of 
claims. It is possible that a Florida court may regard a sexual abuse 
victim’s motion—to determine that a secret settlement with their offender 
is concealing a public hazard—as overbroad, and therefore choose not to 
protect the settlement from concealment under the Sunshine in Litigation 
Act. There may be other grounds, as well, for courts to refuse to apply the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act as prohibiting confidentiality agreements in this 
context. As such, the best solution to this problem is for the Florida 
legislature to enact legislation specifically prohibiting confidentiality 
agreements in sexual abuse settlements. 
V. RESOLUTION: THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE SHOULD ENACT 
LEGISLATION DISFAVORING CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS IN 
SEXUAL ABUSE SETTLEMENTS 
Because leaving this matter up to the interpretation of the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act by Florida courts may result in uneven and 
uncertain results due to their ad hoc decision-making methods, it is 
necessary for the Florida legislature to enact a statute prohibiting the 
concealment of sexual abuse settlements. This law would actually follow 
new trends in the law which, as a result of the #MeToo movement, 
discourage confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse cases.80 The Florida 
legislature can use these newly enacted laws as models to draft and enact 
its own legislation to specifically disfavor confidentiality agreements in 
sexual abuse settlements. The remainder of this section will discuss this 
potential law as a resolution to this problem, including proposed language 
that the Florida legislature can consider, while keeping in mind a victim’s 
privacy concerns. 
The #MeToo Movement and New Legislation 
In light of the #MeToo movement, confidentiality provisions in 
settlements for sexual abuse claims have come under increased criticism.81 
Recently, the United States Congress amended the federal tax code to 
disfavor sexual abuse settlements that are subject to confidentiality 
agreements. Specifically, the code now states (under section 162(q)) that 
settlements and payments for sexual harassment or sexual abuse claims 
subject to confidentiality agreements are not able to be deducted as a 
 
80  Hogan Lovells supra note 40. 
81  Id. 
78 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
business expense.82 This new policy encourages companies to settle sexual 
harassment or sexual abuse claims without the use of confidentiality 
agreements so that the payments related to these claims can be valid 
business deductions under the tax code.83 This is a very persuasive policy 
since settlements of these kind of claims can cost businesses thousands 
and sometimes millions of dollars. And, while Congress did not 
specifically mention the #MeToo movement as a reason for the 
amendment, Congress enacting the specific provision under the current 
climate demonstrates a clear correlation, if not a specific causation. 
The #MeToo movement has also affected legislation at the state 
level in the United States. In response to the #MeToo movement, states 
such as California, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, 
have announced legislation to prevent the use of confidentiality 
agreements in workplace related sexual abuse settlements.84 “Each state 
proposal has its own specifics, but in general they render invalid the use 
or enforcement of [confidentiality] provisions related to sexual abuse, 
either as part of any non-disclosure agreement, or in the context of 
settlement agreements, or both.”85 An example of a newly enacted state 
legislation is the law in Washington. The Washington legislation considers 
confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse cases “void and 
unenforceable.”86 The Washington legislation specially states: 
2) Except for settlement agreements under subsection (4) 
of this section, any nondisclosure agreement, waiver, or 
other document signed by an employee as a condition of 
employment that has the purpose or effect of preventing 
the employee from disclosing or discussing sexual 
harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace, 
at work-related events coordinated by or through the 
employer, or between employees, or between an 
employer and an employee, off the employment premises 
is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.87 
Like in Washington, there was a bill recently introduced by the legislature 
in California that is geared towards sexual abuse in the workplace.88 The 
 
82  26 U.S.C.A. § 162. 
83  Id. 
84  Hogan Lovells supra note 40. 
85  Id. 
86  Non-disclosure agreements that prevent disclosure of sexual assault or sexual 
harassment prohibited--Settlement agreement exception, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 49.44.210. 
87  Id. 
88  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2522. 
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bill was introduced following the Harvey Weinstein scandal.89 This bill is 
titled “STAND (Stand Together Against Non-Disclosures Act).”90 When 
speaking on the importance of the STAND bill, Senator Leyva made these 
comments: 
“SB 820 is an important bill that will finally ban secret 
settlements, one of the primary tools that perpetrators 
have used time and time again to silence victims and 
prevent them from publicly acknowledging the 
harassment, assault, and discrimination they have 
endured,” Senator Leyva said.  “I am grateful that my 
Senate colleagues approved this bill today, since it sends 
a loud and clear message to victims that we believe them, 
we stand by them and will do all we can to protect 
them.  SB 820 shreds the curtain of secrecy that has forced 
victims to remain silent and empowers them to speak their 
truth so that we can hopefully protect other victims 
moving forward.  Perpetrators must be held accountable 
for their actions and SB 820 is a sensible bill that helps to 
keep workplaces in California, both in the public and 
private sectors, free from sexual harassment and assault. 
Enough is enough!”91 
Even countries outside of the United States have begun 
disfavoring confidentiality agreements in cases of sexual assault and 
harassment, most likely due in no small part to the #MeToo movement. 
For example, in Great Britain, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (which 
regulates law firms), recently issued a warning notice that confidentiality 
agreements were being used improperly.92 The regulation authority said 
that confidentiality agreements “should not be used to prevent people from 
reporting misconduct to regulators or offenses to law enforcement 
agencies, or as a means of improperly threatening litigation against, or 
otherwise seeking improperly to influence, an individual in order to 
prevent or deter or influence a proper disclosure.”93 Soon after the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority’s warning notice, the British Parliament’s 
 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Senate Passes Leyva Bill Banning Secret Settlements in Sexual Assault and 
Harassment Cases, (May 21, 2018), https://sd20.senate.ca.gov/news/2018-05-21-senate-
passes-leyva-bill-banning-secret-settlements-sexual-assault-and-harassment. 
92  Ben Martin, What are confidentiality agreements at the heart of Britain’s ‘Me Too’ 
debate?, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2018, 9:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-
nda-explainer-idUSKCN1N01WP. 
93  Id. 
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Women and Equalities Committee released a report on sexual abuse in the 
workplace, which urged the government to “clean up” the use of 
confidentiality agreements.94 The committee also urged the government to 
enforce better control and regulation of the agreements due to the concern 
that these agreements are being used to silence victims.95 As a result, 
Prime Minister Theresa May commented that some employers are using 
confidentiality agreements unethically, and promised to  “ . . . bring 
forward measures for consideration for consultation to seek to improve the 
regulation around non-disclosure agreements and make it absolutely 
explicit to employees when a non-disclosure agreement does not apply or 
cannot be enforced.”96 
While these reforms do illustrate a shift towards the increased 
regulation of confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements, they 
are largely limited to the employment context. This is undesirable, because 
legislation limited to the employment sector does not provide enough 
protection to all possible victims of sexual harassment or sexual assault. 
For example, the children who were abused by Catholic priests would not 
be protected under laws preventing confidentiality in sexual abuse claims 
only in the employment context. Instead of enacting legislation 
particularly aimed at employees, it would be more effective for state and 
federal legislatures to create laws that prevent confidentiality agreements 
in sexual abuse settlements across all sectors. California has actually 
passed a statute which disfavors confidentiality clauses in sexual assault 
and harassment settlement agreements, which applies outside of the 
workplace context.97 California’s “Felony Sex Law”98 “prohibits the use 
of confidentiality clauses in civil settlements if the ‘factual foundation’ for 
the underlying allegations involved acts that could be prosecuted as felony 
sexual offenses.”99 Furthermore, California requires attorneys to comply 
with the law as well, under threat of reprimand by the state bar 
association.100 Specifically, the statute prescribes that “an attorney who 
demands that a confidentiality provision be included in a settlement 
agreement that conceals an act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex 
offense, or even advises a client to sign such an agreement, may face 
discipline by the State Bar of California.”101 This enforcement of the law 
against the attorneys provides an additional level of protection for a 
 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002; Prasad, supra note 2, at 2534-35. 
98  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002. 
99  Prasad, supra note 2, at 2534-35. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
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victim’s right to speak. Yet, the law does not apply to cases which are only 
likely to be convicted as misdemeanors.102 
Even though there are currently no cases where courts in 
California have interpreted or applied the “Felony Sex Law,”103 on its face, 
the California law generally appears to have been successful in providing 
significant protection for victims and their right to speak in sexual abuse 
cases. “Given that [the California law] covers sexual acts that can be 
prosecuted as felonies, however, it has tremendous potential to be applied 
to rapes or sexual harassment with criminal undertones that are settled with 
confidentiality agreements.”104 In comparing the California “Felony Sex 
Law” to the other legislations of this kind, on its face, the California law 
provides more protection to victims than the other legislations because it 
is not limited to an employment context. As such, if the Florida legislature 
were to consider enacting laws invalidating confidentiality clauses in 
sexual abuse settlements,  California’s felony sex law may be a good place 
to start (although Florida’s law should not limit its disfavor of 
confidentiality clauses to cases involving sexual assault or harassment that 
can be prosecuted as a felony, and should instead expand it to include 
misdemeanors, as well). The proposed language of this statute is as 
follows: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a 
settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of 
factual information related to the action is prohibited in 
any civil action the factual foundation for which 
establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of 
the following: 
(1) An act that may be prosecuted as a sex offense. 
(2) An act of childhood sexual abuse. 
(3) An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, or conduct 
prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant. 
(4) An act of sexual assault against an elder or dependent 
adult.105 
It should be noted that the language of this proposed statute does not 
prevent a victim from refusing to speak – that is, from keeping the details 
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of her alleged assault, harassment, or abuse confidential – if she so 
chooses. Instead, the proposed statutory language attempts to protect a 
victim’s right to privacy by reserving victims the right to keep these details 
private while preventing the alleged abuser from requiring the victim to 
remain silent, as a condition of settlement. This balances a victim’s privacy 
interests with their right to speak, as well as their ability to seek justice in 
a court of law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The #MeToo movement has given many victims of sexual abuse 
a voice to finally speak out, discuss their potentially traumatizing 
experiences, and seek healing and support from their community. 
However, a hashtag and comments on social media simply are not enough. 
The law must also give these victims support and provide protection for 
victims by preventing predators from becoming repeat offenders under 
promises of silence guaranteed by confidentiality agreements. Indeed, the 
utilization of confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements dates 
as far back as the Catholic church scandal (with Catholic priests abusing 
children) and have continued to be used in cases as recent as the Harvey 
Weinstein and R. Kelly scandals. These clauses should be void, by law. 
Confidentiality clauses in sexual abuse settlements permit the sexual 
abusers to hide their identities from the public and enables them to repeat 
their offenses. They infringe upon the public’s right to know and the 
victims’ right to speak. 
Under the Sunshine in Litigation Act, sexual abusers are a “public 
hazard” because they are “person[s] . . . that ha[ve] caused and [are] likely 
to cause injury.”106 Since the Act prohibits concealment of public hazards, 
sexual abuse settlements should not be kept from the public and victims 
should not be prevented from speaking.107 Therefore, this interpretation of 
the Act would prevent concealing a sexual abuser’s identity and, as a 
result, confidentiality agreements in sexual abuse settlements would be 
considered void under Florida law.108 If Florida courts were to determine 
that the concealment of sexual abuse settlements is not prohibited by the 
Sunshine in Litigation Act, the Florida legislature should then enact a 
statute prohibiting the concealment of sexual abuse settlements. This law 
could mirror California’s felony sex law, but without limiting it to felonies. 
This would provide the maximum protection for sexual abuse victims and 
help prevent future victims by encouraging public disclosure of sexual 
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abusers instead of shielding their identities under confidentiality 
agreements. The #MeToo movement has illuminated many of the 
deficiencies in our social and legal approaches to victims of sexual assault, 
harassment and abuse – it is vital that our state courts and legislatures 
attempt to close these gaps, for the protection of current and future victims, 
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